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Abstract:  
Tax compliance, i.e. citizens’ disposition to pay taxes either voluntary or enforced, is an extremely important 
topic at any moment, but mostly when governments have to finance public goods with few tax money. In the light of 
these realities, governments have to find ways of providing public goods by boosting tax compliance. In order to 
achieve this goal, various factors influencing compliance have to be considered among which the efficiency of the 
government in managing tax money. In an experimental tax game preceded by a self-reported tax compliance 
attitudes questionnaire, we show that the information concerning government’s efficiency significantly influences 
tax payments. Moreover, tax compliance attitudes act as a mediator between the independent variable scenario (i.e., 
information about government efficiency) and the dependent variable tax payments.  
  
Keywords: tax compliance attitudes, economic experiment, government efficiency.  
 
JEL classification: G02; G28; H26. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
From the early dawns of mankind, taxes have been a constant reality in all societies across time. According to 
Torgler (2007: 5) [26], Ancient Egyptians were no strangers to taxation as pharaohs levied significant amounts of 
money to accomplish their architectural visions. Along the process Egyptian rulers had to deal with tax evasion and 
corruption among tax collectors called “scribes”. If the first inconvenience was solved through increased “auditing” 
of taxpayers, the second one diminished through tighter monitoring of field tax collectors with the help of special tax 
collectors and granting higher salaries to all categories of collectors. In the same vein, the Rosetta Stone, the famous 
artifact  that  unraveled  the meaning of hieroglyphs, contained information about the Egyptian  taxation system 
retrieved from pictograms portraying a tax amnesty which ended with setting free imprisoned tax evaders and 
erasing their remaining debts. Moreover, Adams (1994: 8) [1] takes note of Ancient taxation issues reminding that 
pharaoh Khiti recommended his tax collectors to treat poor taxpayers with leniency, even erase debt or skip auditing 
if taxpayers barely made ends meet.    
As societies evolved, the purpose of tax collecting has changed. If in the past taxes served as sources ready to 
finance rulers’ and state officials every whim, nowadays they are used to provide public goods from which both 
state officials and ordinary taxpayers can derive utility. Another notable difference is that today’s people are more 
aware of the importance of taxes for the evolution of society as a whole than they were in the old days. With respect 
to this issue, raising tax awareness is a key priority for tax authorities in various countries around the world. Besides 
media campaigns aimed at mitigating tax evasion and corruption, tax authorities try to incentivize taxpayers in 
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paying their share through decreasing taxes if paid before due date or granting special prizes to the most aware and 
active citizens. A notable example in this sense is given by the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) which grants 
through its Whistleblower Office the “Informant Award” to any taxpayer who shares solid evidence about another 
person failing to pay taxes. Provided that the IRS uses his information, the taxpayer in question is entitled to receive 
up to 30% of the amount collected by the IRS from the exposed non-compliant person.      
When it comes to paying taxes, two types of behavior can emerge: compliance and non-compliance. Tax 
compliance is defined by four characteristics (Franzoni, 2000: 54) [11]: 1) true reporting of the tax base; 2) correct 
computation of the liability; 3) timely filing of the return; 4) timely payment of the amounts due. If taxpayers fail to 
meet any of the four characteristics, their behavior is categorized as non-compliance. Depending on the reasons 
which drive taxpayers to pay their dues, compliance can be either  voluntary or enforced as suggested by the 
“slippery slope” model (Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl, 2008) [16]. On one hand, voluntary compliance is positively 
linked to trust in tax authorities. According to the concept, taxpayers pay taxes on a voluntary basis because of 
several reasons, among which: duty to behave as model citizen; willingness to contribute to the well-being of other 
citizens; willingness to do the right thing (Kirchler and Wahl, 2010; Wahl, Kastlunger and Kirchler, 2010) [17]-[29] 
etc. On the other hand, enforced compliance is related to the power of tax authorities. According to the concept, 
among the reasons which boost enforced compliance are the following: risk of being audited and fined; willingness 
to avoid severe punishment (either financial through fines or legal through freedom deprivation);  insufficient 
knowledge about taxation in order to ensure evasion without attracting authorities’ attention (Kirchler and Wahl, 
2010; Wahl, Kastlunger and Kirchler, 2010) [17]-[29]. By the same token, depending on the legality of taxpayers’ 
actions, non-compliance can be avoidance or evasion. Tax avoidance refers to legally decreasing tax liabilities by 
using the loopholes into the tax law (Webley, 2004) [30], while tax evasion means deliberating breaking the law in 
order to decrease tax liabilities (Elffers, Weigel and Hessing, 1987) [10]. Tackling the issue of tax avoidance, US 
Supreme Court Justice George Sutherland mentioned that “the legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of 
what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted”. 
Therefore, if tax avoidance is tolerated in some countries and banned in others, tax evasion triggers  negative 
attitudes everywhere around the world.  
As Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998) [4] briefly underline, tax compliance deals with the concepts of 
equity, incidence, and efficiency.  Fiscal equity  refers to levying fiscal liabilities by taxing citizens differently 
according to their contribution capacity. Thus, horizontal equity is achieved when taxpayers with similar situations 
are approached in the same manner: tax authorities set the same income tax for taxpayers belonging to the same 
social category.  Namely, two taxpayers who obtain equal amounts of income from two different sources will pay 
the same income tax. The motto for horizontal equity is “equal treatment for equal taxpayers”, and its application 
eliminates the disadvantages of arbitrary fiscal discrimination (Hillman, 2003: 472) [14]. Vertical equity is achieved 
when taxpayers with different situations are approached in distinct  manners: tax authorities establish different 
income taxes for taxpayers belonging to different social categories. Namely, two taxpayers who obtain different 
amounts of income from the same source will pay distinct income taxes. Although the two taxpayers contribute 
differently to the state budget, the concept of equity stands in the sense that both do the same sacrifice (i.e., give up 
to a percentage of their income for the benefit of the state). The motto of vertical equity is “equal treatment for 
unequal taxpayers” (Hillman, 2003: 472) [14]. Taking into account the abovementioned aspects, it can be stated that 
a tax system is perceived as equitable when every taxpayer is attributed a fiscal burden that matches his capacity of 
generating taxable income/revenue. Incidence refers to the study of the groups who bear the tax burden (Fullerton 
and Metcalf, 2002) [12]. In other words, it assumes analyzing the effects of tax policies on the distribution of 
economic welfare (Kotlikoff and Summers, 1987: 1043) [18].      
In the following the focus will be on the concept of efficiency, more precisely on governments’ efficiency in 
managing tax money. In theory, efficiency is defined as a ratio between the effort undertaken to generate a certain 
effect and the effect itself. Therefore, efficiency is at maximum when it generates the highest effect level with the 
lowest effort level. As leading economists Samuelson and Nordhaus (1998) [20] stated, a government is efficient in 
managing tax money when it uses these resources with maximum yield in order to satisfy taxpayers’ needs. In terms 
of effort undertaken with taxation, the government incurs certain costs to ensure proper tax collection, namely: 
implementing the  fiscal policy through tax authorities; increasing awareness through media coverage about the 
importance of paying taxes; hiring tax agents for auditing and sanctioning non-compliant taxpayers; notifying 
taxpayers  about unpaid taxes.  When talking about the effect  of taxation,  it materializes through social and 
investment policies designed to provide adequate public goods.  
Generally,  governments which levy higher taxes also achieve higher  efficiency in using tax money. One 
possible explanation for this economic reality is the fact that high levels of taxes make authorities more responsible 
and more accountable towards taxpayers. And this is because the only situation in which taxpayers are willing to 
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incur high tax burdens is when the quality of public goods provided by the state match their financial efforts. For 
example, Scandinavian countries have one of the highest taxation in the world, but they also provide the highest 
quality public goods. Not to mention that according to the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index which measures the perceived level of public sector corruption and ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very 
clean), Scandinavian countries are the least corrupted countries in the world with Denmark and Finland ranking 
second (9.4), Sweden fourth (9.3), and Norway sixth (9). The efficiency with which governments manage tax money 
is influenced also by the type of democracy. In this sense, direct democracies (i.e., citizens make decisions on the 
tax system directly, without representation) seem to be more efficient than representative democracies (i.e., citizens 
vote for representatives who later make decisions on their behalf). Being a direct democracy, Switzerland has one of 
the most efficient tax money management in the world. The efficiency from the public sector spilled also into the 
private sector making Switzerland world-known “banker of the banks”.      
There is definitely a positive two-way link between government efficiency in managing public funds, either 
perceived (through information provided by the media) or experienced (through the quality of public goods) and 
taxpayers’ levels of compliance. On one hand the more efficient the governments, the more compliant the taxpayers. 
Related to this issue,  Scandinavian countries represent again the  epic  example: the high  efficiency of their 
governments translates into a compliance level of over 95% among taxpayers. On the other hand, a high level of 
compliance can increase efficiency in the sense that costs of monitoring taxpayers and applying deterrent strategies 
decrease. Thus, governments have more tax money at their disposal to invest in public goods. Slemrod (1992: 7) 
[21] briefly elaborated on this aspect: “From the tax collection standpoint, it is extraordinarily expensive to arrange 
an enforcement regime so that, from a strict cost-benefit calculus, noncompliance does not appear attractive to many 
citizens. It follows that methods that reinforce and encourage taxpayers’ devotion to their responsibilities as citizens 
play an important role in the tax collection process”. If taxpayers develop the belief that the government inefficiently 
handles public money, this particular belief might influence their behavior and turn tax compliance (either voluntary 
or enforced) into non-compliance (either avoidance or evasion). To  mitigate such negative consequence, 
governments have to implement transparent fiscal policies, give proper and prompt information to the taxpayers 
regarding any changes into the tax system, and be accountable for any of the decisions implemented. 
The present study aims at investigating the extent to which  perceived governmental efficiency drives tax 
compliance behavior.  In addition, it also aims at exploring whether  self-reported attitudes concerning tax 
compliance are mediating actual behavior elicited through a tax game. The remainder of the article is the following. 
Section 1 gives some directions concerning tax literature. Section 2 presents the method, with focus on the subject 
pool, material, and procedure used in the study. Section 3 is dedicated to the results and interpretations. The ending 
part of the paper contains the discussion and concluding remarks.  
       
2. Literature review 
 
Literature on tax compliance flourished after Becker’s “theory of crime” study and the publication of the first 
theoretical models of tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Srinivasan, 1973; Yitzhaki, 1974) [2]-[22]-[28]. 
Since then, both theoretical and empirical research (either surveys or experiments) focused on one of the most 
intriguing and difficult to answer questions: why people pay taxes? This particular issue is known in the literature as 
the “puzzle of tax compliance”. Related to the aforementioned puzzle, Alm and Torgler (2011: 635) [3] take things 
forward by stating the following: “Still, the puzzle of tax compliance is not why there is so much cheating. Instead, 
the real puzzle is why there is so little cheating. Typically, the percent of all individual income tax returns that are 
audited is often less than 1% and the penalties on even fraudulent evasion are only a fraction of unpaid taxes. 
Virtually all economic models of taxpayer behavior conclude that there should be much more tax evasion than is 
actually observed. However, most people pay most of their taxes most of the time”. Indeed, the classical model of 
tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) [2] is built on the image of a taxpayer behaving like a typical Smithian 
homo oeconomicus: rational utility maximizer who will evade taxes every time opportunities arise, provided the 
benefits obtained from evasion exceed the costs of being sanctioned. In spite of these gloomy predictions, the 
majority of studies invalidate the main assumptions of the classical model of tax evasion and its results, namely that 
taxpayers evade almost all the time and that tax evasion correlates negatively with audit probability and punishment 
degree. Various authors suggested that, besides the economic standpoint, other perspectives (e.g., psychological, 
political, etc.) should be considered when analyzing compliance  (for a detailed overview, see Kirchler, 2007; 
Andreoni et al., 1998) [15]-[4].  
Regarding the economic factors which influence tax compliance, the list considered is somehow generous and 
includes among all predicting variables the following: audit probability (either one-shot or repeated), income, tax 
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rate, and fine. For example, related to the variable income, Witte and Woodbury (1985) [31] propose and estimate a 
model concerning the implications of income tax law on compliance. According to their empirical results, 
compliance is negatively related to moral ambivalence and positively related to audit probability, information 
reporting and tax  withholding.  Guala and Mittone (2005) [13]  investigate the influence of multiple audits on 
compliance behavior in a repeated tax game. The authors conclude that compliance mitigates in the rounds 
following an audit only to increase again along with the likelihood of another audit. This phenomenon is known in 
the taxation literature as the “bomb-crater” effect, notion coined by Guala and Mittone.           
As for the psychological  factors,  for instance, Braithwaite (2003) [7]  proposes an interesting concept 
measuring the distance between taxpayers and tax authorities called motivational postures. In her view, these 
postures express “the interconnected sets of beliefs and attitudes that are consciously held and openly shared with 
others” (Braithwaite, 2003: 18) [7]. The concept was developed by categorizing taxpayers’ statements concerning 
their exposure to the tax authorities retrieved from various self-report questionnaires. Thus, the five motivational 
postures are as follows: “commitment”, “capitulation”, “resistance”, “disengagement”, and “game-playing”. The 
first two express a small distance between taxpayers and tax authorities, while the last three show a large distance. 
“Commitment” characterizes taxpayers who want to pay taxes out of moral or ethical considerations. “Capitulation” 
refers to taxpayers who recognize authorities’ legitimacy and decide to cooperate with them. In the case of 
“resistance”, taxpayers are portrayed as aversive and always questioning authorities’ legitimacy, “disengagement” 
refers to taxpayers who decide not to get involved in the fiscal system, and “game playing” is familiar to taxpayers 
who are interested in identifying and using the loopholes into the tax law. Taking into consideration the two types of 
behavior (compliance vs. non-compliance), it can be stated that the first three represent attitudes of compliance, 
while the last two attitudes of non-compliance.          
  The  category  of political determinants  includes  besides  government  efficiency in managing tax money 
variables like tax law complexity, tax system complexity, or governance quality. Relative to latter variable 
mentioned,  Torgler, Schaffner,  and Macintyre (2007) [27]  report data collected through field  experiments, 
laboratory  experimental,  and surveys.  The authors show that governance quality in general  and  voice and 
accountability, rule of law, political stability and absence of violence, regulatory quality and corruption control in 
particular impact on tax compliance.   
  
3. Method 
3.1. Participants 
The subject pool was made out of 60 participants, all students in Economics from Babes-Bolyai University 
(61,7% females, age ranging between 19 and 23 years, M = 21.2, SD = 1.01, MD = 21); 71.7% coming from an 
urban area, 40% with work experience (41.67% in trade, 37.5 % in services, 20.83% in agriculture). The subjects 
were recruited on a voluntary basis, from a database compiled by the authors during previous research studies.  
 
3.2.Material and procedure 
The procedure of the present research study consists of four steps which will be described in the following. 
 
Step one: survey on compliance attitudes 
First, subjects had to fill in a paper-pencil questionnaire. Each questionnaire was structured into two parts: 20 
items concerning voluntary compliance (5 items), enforced compliance (5 items), tax avoidance (5 items), and tax 
evasion (5 items); socio-demographical data.  Each item contained an answering scale from 1 = complete 
agreement/high probability  to  7  = complete disagreement/low probability.  The socio-demographical variables 
collected were age, gender, environment, work experience, and work domain. All items were adopted from the tax 
compliance inventory TAX-I (Kirchler and Wahl, 2010)  [17].  The  wording of the voluntary and enforced 
compliance items contained abstract terms, while the wording of the tax avoidance and tax evasion items contained 
concrete behavioral intentions.    
More specifically, the four scales used in the questionnaire were as follows. 
The voluntary compliance (VC) scale included 5 items concerning taxpayers’ willingness to cooperate with tax 
authorities based on moral, ethical considerations, or social norms (e.g., “When I pay my taxes as required by the 
regulations, I do so because I regard it as my duty as citizen”). The enforced compliance (EC) scale contained 5 
items referring to taxpayers’ perceptions of tax authorities’ power to deter non-compliant behavior (e.g., “When I 
pay my taxes as required by the regulations, I do so because a great many tax audits are carried out”). The tax 
avoidance (TA) scale was made out of 5 items expressing fictitious scenarios stating concrete legal mitigations of tax 
dues. At the end of the scenarios, participants were inquired about their likeliness of engaging in such behavior (e.g., 
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You could take a detailed look at the tax regulations yourself to search for potential savings. How likely would you 
be to take this detailed look at the tax regulations?”). The tax evasion (TE) scale included 5 items, each describing 
also a fictitious scenario stating concrete illegal mitigations of tax dues. Like in the case of tax avoidance items, we 
asked participants how likely they would be to display such behavior (e.g., “A customer paid in cash and did not 
require an invoice. You could intentionally omit this income on your income tax return. How likely is it that you 
would omit this income?”).  
For the translation of the questionnaire a double procedure with two independent translators was used in order 
to eliminate any possible inconsistencies: a first translation from English to Romanian was followed by a second one 
from Romanian to English. Completing the questionnaire took approximately 10 minutes.   
 
Step two: effort task 
After filling in the questionnaires, subjects had to perform an effort task consisting of counting ones from a 
sheet of paper with 129 ones and 135 zeros over a period of two minutes. The purpose of the task was to provide 
participants the opportunity of earning an income which would be later subject of a tax game. In addition, we 
wanted to involve participants in a lifelike situation and make them work for their income, as we were interested in 
taxes paid on wage income. We chose not to simply endow participants in the beginning of the tax game to avoid a 
lottery winning cognitive bias. According to mental accounting theory (Thaler, 1980; 1985; 1999) [23]-[24]-[25], 
people treat money differently especially when it comes from different sources, i.e. wage or lotto. Generally they 
value more money obtained thorough effort and have the tendency to squander money easily obtained.    
Each one counted correctly was worth three experimental monetary units (EMU). The amount gained by each 
subject was determined as the number of ones counted correctly multiplied by three. If a participant reported a 
number of ones above 129, his income would decrease by the additional ones counted incorrectly multiplied by 
three. The following exchange rate was implemented: 1EMU = .05 lei.     
   
Step three: tax game 
In step three, participants were informed that they would have to perform a one-shot paper-pencil tax game 
which consisted of declaring the amount earned during the effort task and paying the income tax of 16%, according 
to the Romanian tax code. After the general instructions, participants received a scenario about government 
efficiency in managing tax money: half of the scenarios indicated that the government was spending tax money in an 
efficient way; the other half indicated that the government was spending tax money in an inefficient way. In the 
following, participants were given a standardized tax form requesting them to declare the income earned during the 
effort task, compute, and pay the 16% tax rate corresponding to this income.  
 
Step four: survey on reasons behind tax compliance behavior   
At the end of the tax game, participants filled in an ex-post questionnaire with both closed and open-ended 
questions stating the reasons for which they declared/not declared the entire income and paid all tax dues.   
 
4. Results      
 
As a first step into the analysis, we computed descriptives (mean, standard deviation, median, skeweness) and 
correlations between the 5 items of each scale in order to establish whether all items can be considered for further 
analysis. Table 1 contains this information.     
 
Table  1. Descriptive statistics, correlations of the items  belonging  to the voluntary compliance, enforced 
compliance, tax avoidance, and tax evasion scales. 
Item  M  SD  MD  Skeweness   
VC1 
Correlations 
VC2 
 
VC3 
   
VC4 
 
VC5   
VC1  3.02  1.61  3.00  -.05  1.00 
     
   
VC2  3.15  1.36  3.00  -.16  .74
**  1.00     
   
VC3  3.17  1.48  3.00  -.10  .68
**  .81
**  1.00
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VC4 
 
VC5 
 
 
3.07 
 
3.08 
1.45 
 
1.56 
3.00 
 
3.00 
.05 
 
.08 
.74
** 
 
.73
** 
 
EC1 
.73
** 
 
.79
** 
 
EC2 
.75
** 
 
.70
** 
 
EC3 
  1.00 
 
.81
** 
 
EC4 
 
 
1.00 
 
EC5
 
EC1 
 
EC2 
 
EC3 
 
EC4 
 
EC5 
 
 
3.05 
 
3.35 
 
2.98 
 
3.03 
 
3.20 
1.52 
 
1.54 
 
1.57 
 
1.45 
 
1.51 
3.00 
 
3.00 
 
3.00 
 
3.00 
 
3.00 
.12 
 
-.13 
 
.19 
 
.11 
 
.05 
1.00 
 
.88
** 
 
.72
** 
 
.73
** 
 
.65
** 
 
TA1 
 
 
1.00 
 
.79
** 
 
.78
** 
 
.66
** 
 
TA2 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
 
.83
** 
 
.74
** 
 
TA3 
   
 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
 
.78
** 
 
TA4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
 
TA5 
TA1 
 
TA2 
 
TA3 
 
TA4 
 
TA5 
3.30 
 
3.25 
 
3.50 
 
3.58 
 
3.52 
1.91 
 
1.71 
 
1.72 
 
1.84 
 
2.10 
4.00 
 
4.00 
 
3.50 
 
3.58 
 
3.52 
.05 
 
.01 
 
.02 
 
.01 
 
.11 
1.00 
 
.78
** 
 
.73
** 
 
.75
** 
 
.79
** 
 
 
1.00 
 
.73
** 
 
.72
** 
 
.77
** 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
 
.80
** 
 
.76
** 
   
 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
 
.91
** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
 
 
         
TE1 
 
TE2 
 
TE3 
   
TE4 
 
TE5 
TE1 
 
TE2 
 
TE3 
 
TE4 
 
TE5 
3.05 
 
3.12 
 
3.20 
 
3.18 
 
3.23 
1.57 
 
1.62 
 
1.70 
 
1.76 
 
1.77 
4.00 
 
4.00 
 
3.00 
 
4.00 
 
3.50 
-.20 
 
.08 
 
.09 
 
-.10 
 
.13 
 
 
1.00 
 
.73
** 
 
.87
** 
 
.84
** 
 
.82
** 
 
 
1.00 
 
.73
** 
 
.68
** 
 
.74
** 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
 
.89
** 
 
.84
** 
   
 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
 
.85
** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
Note: ** Correlation coefficients significant with p < .01. 
 
As it can be observed from the table 1, all 20 items are suitable for further analysis as there were neither 
skewed items nor items generating floor or ceiling effects. Based on this fact, we obtained indices for the scales of 
voluntary compliance, enforced compliance, tax avoidance, and tax evasion by averaging the answers to the five 
items included in each scale. Furthermore, descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviations, median) were computed 
and the normal distribution was checked. According to both Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests, data are 
normally distributed. Correlations of the four scales were also considered assuming a positive relation between 
voluntary compliance and enforced compliance, and between tax avoidance and tax evasion. In addition, we expect 
a negative relation between compliance scales (either voluntary or enforced) and non-compliance scales (either 
avoidance or evasion). These preliminary analyses are displayed in table 2.     
 
Table  2.  Descriptive statistics, Cronbach  alphas,  correlations of the voluntary compliance, enforced 
compliance, tax avoidance, tax evasion scales.  
Scale  M  SD  MD  Alpha  VC  EC    TA  TE 
 
Voluntary 
compliance (VC) 
3.10  1.33  3.30  .94  1.00 
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Enforced 
compliance (EC) 
3.12  1.36  3.00  .94  .85
**  1.00   
   
   
           
   
Tax avoidance 
(TA) 
3.43  1.68  3.90  .94  -.62
**  -.50
**    1.00   
   
           
   
Tax evasion (TE)  3.16  1.54  3.70  .95  -.49
**  -.37
**    .91
**  1.00
 
           
       
Note: ** Correlation coefficients significant with p < .01. 
 
From the above table, one can see that the assumptions regarding the positive and the negative correlations were 
confirmed and that the scales used in the questionnaire proved to be highly reliable. 
Further, a principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted on the 20 items with orthogonal rotation 
(varimax). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis, KMO = .90, and all 
KMO values for individual items were above .79. Bartlett’s test of sphericity 𝜒2(190) = 1383.71,𝑝 < .001, 
indicated that the correlations between items were sufficiently large for PCA. An initial analysis was run to generate 
eigenvalues for each component in the data. Two components had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 (11.76 
and 3.75 respectively) and in combination explained 77.54% of the variance. Thus, we took into consideration two 
factors, i.e. compliance, containing the voluntary and enforced items and non-compliance, containing the tax 
avoidance and tax evasion items. All items showed factor loadings above 0.40.    
In order to investigate the extent to which the perceived governmental efficiency in managing tax money drives 
tax compliance behavior, we ran a linear regression with scenario as predictor and tax payments as dependent 
variable, expectating that the relationship between the two is statistically significant. As mentioned before, variable 
scenario refers to the information given to participants with respect to the efficiency/inefficiency with which the 
government spends tax money, while tax payments variable indicates tax liabilities paid by participants during the 
tax game. As expected, scenario significantly predicted tax payments, 𝗽 = .50,𝑡(58) = 4.85, 𝑝 < .001, meaning 
that the information given to participants shaped their decision to comply or not with tax requirements. Moreover, 
scenario explains a significant proportion of variance in tax payments, 𝑅2 = .29,𝐹(1,58) = 23.56,𝑝 < .001. 
   
Mediation analyses  
To determine whether subjects’ attitudes towards compliance influence their actual behavior in the tax game, 
mediation analyses were conducted with scenario as independent variable (IV), tax payments as dependent variable 
(DV) and compliance and non-compliance as mediators.  
 
Mediating effect of compliance 
In order to conduct mediation analysis as suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986) [5], we ran two additional 
linear regressions besides the one involving variables scenario and tax payments. The first regression studied the 
relation between variables scenario and compliance, while the second one between variables scenario, tax payments 
and compliance (as mediator). Regression analyses revealed significant influences of the predictor on the dependent 
variable. In the first case, scenario  was related to  compliance, 𝗽 = 2.33, 𝑡(58) = 14.37, 𝑝 < .001, and  it 
significantly explained  the variance in compliance, 𝑅2 = .78,𝐹(1,58) = 206.59,𝑝 < .001.  In the second case, 
compliance had a significant influence on tax payments when scenario was also predictor, 𝗽 = .16, 𝑡(58) = 2.01, 
𝑝 < .05, explaining a significant variance in tax payments, 𝑅2 = .34,𝐹(1,58) = 14.42,𝑝 < .001. 
As it can be noticed in figure 1, the standardized regression coefficient mitigated significantly when controlling 
for compliance. Moreover, other two mediation conditions were fulfilled: scenario was a significant predictor of 
both compliance and tax payments.  
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Figure 1. Standardized regression coefficients for the relation between scenario and tax payments mediated 
by compliance. 
 
Note: **p <.01; the number in parentheses indicates the standardized regression coefficient when the mediating 
variable is included in the analysis. 
 
Running the Sobel test yielded the statistic 𝑍 = 2.00,𝑆𝐸 = .19,𝑝 = .04. Therefore, according to this analysis, it is 
confirmed that compliance significantly mediates the relationship between scenario and tax payments. Regarding the 
type of mediation, based on the fact that the correlation between IV and DV has been reduced to a non-significant 
level due to the mediator we can state that a full mediation has been identified. In addition, the indirect effect and the 
total effect have to be considered: the first is represented by the value of the initial correlation between IV and DV 
which now goes through the mediator to the DV; the second is represented by the correlation between the IV and 
DV. The ratio between the indirect effect (.41) and the total effect (.54) equals .76 meaning that more than two 
thirds (76%) of the effect of the IV on DV goes through the mediator, and only less than one third is direct. Thus, 
full mediation is also supported by this ratio.      
 
Mediating effect of non-compliance   
Like in the first mediation analysis, we ran two additional linear regressions. The first regression referred to the 
relationship between variables scenario and non-compliance, while the second one referred to the variables scenario, 
tax payments and non-compliance (as mediator). Significant influences of the independent variable on the dependent 
variables were confirmed. Thus, in the first regression, scenario influenced non-compliance, 𝗽 = −1.89, 𝑡(58) =
−6.00, 𝑝 < .001, and it significantly explained the variance in non-compliance, 𝑅2 = .38,𝐹(1,58) = 36.05,𝑝 <
.001. In the second regression,  non-compliance  was related to tax  payments when scenario was the second 
predictor,  𝗽 = −.10 ,  𝑡(58) = −2.43 ,  𝑝 < .05 , explaining a significant variance in tax payments, 𝑅2 =
.36,𝐹(1,58) = 15.73,𝑝 < .001. 
Although the abovementioned relations reached significance (𝑝 < .001), variable non-compliance does not 
qualify as a mediator because the standardized coefficient of the relationship scenario-non-compliance-tax payments 
is higher than the coefficient of the original relationship scenario-tax payments (Baron and Kenny, 1986) [5]. Figure 
2 confirms this conclusion. 
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Figure  2. Standardized regression coefficients for the relation between scenario, tax payments,  and non-
compliance. 
 
Note: **p <.01; the number in parentheses indicates the standardized regression coefficient when non-compliance is 
included in the analysis.  
 
Ex-post questionnaires analysis 
In the ex-post questionnaire, participants indicated the reasons behind their tax compliance behavior. Figure 3 
shows the overall answers given by the participants.  
non-compliance 
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Figure 3. Participants' tax compliance reasons 
 
As it can be seen in figure 3, half of the participants indicated that complying with the tax law and thus paying entire 
taxes was the “right thing to do”. At the other end, only 10% didn’t pay  taxes on the basis that they “found 
opportunities not to comply”. Taking into consideration variable gender, the distribution of participants’ reasons is 
presented in the following two figures.      
 
 
                  Figure 4. Men tax compliance reasons                         Figure 5. Women tax compliance reasons 
 
In the case of both men (61%) and women (49%), the foremost tax compliance reason was the “right thing to do”, 
meaning that the majority of participants complied voluntarily and paid all tax dues. Regarding men, the second 
reason in ranking was “decided not to comply”, indicating that 22% of male participants evaded taxes during the tax 
game.  Regarding women, the second ranked reason was “tax system not efficient”,  meaning that 32%  female 
participants complied on an enforced basis even though the tax system was not efficient. These results are in line 
with recent studies focused on gender behavioral differences stating that women are more prone to following social 
norms and are more risk averse than men (e.g., Croson and Buchan, 1999; Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Loewenstein 
et al., 2001) [8]-[9]-[19].    
 
5.  Discussion and conclusions 
  The present study focused on highlighting a possible relationship between taxpayers’ compliance behavior and 
the perceptions regarding government’s efficiency in managing public funds. Moreover, we investigated whether 
attitudes towards compliance/non-compliance act as a mediator in the relationship between perceived efficiency of 
the government and tax payments.  
  The subject pool consisted of 60 Economics students from Babeş-Bolyai University recruited on a voluntary 
basis. They were randomly selected from a database compiled by the authors during previous research projects.  
Financial incentives were provided according to participants’ performance in the study. The behavioral data was 
collected on a paper-and-pencil basis after the implementation of four steps as follows: an ex-ante questionnaire 
measuring attitudes toward compliance with emphasis on voluntary compliance, enforced compliance, tax 
avoidance, and tax evasion; an effort task designed to provide participants with the opportunity of earning income 
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based on performance in a restricted time period; a tax game in which participants had to declare the income earned 
during the effort task, compute and pay 16% taxes corresponding to this income; an ex-post questionnaire aimed at 
eliciting participants’ compliance/non-compliance reasons. 
  The methodology used in the data analysis was various, ranging from descriptive statistics, correlations, 
reliability analysis, factor analysis, regression analysis to mediation analysis.  
  First and foremost, we  computed descriptives for the compliance/non-compliance items in the ex-ante 
questionnaire to check their suitability for further analyses. All 20 items were considered fit, and moreover, they 
proved to be highly reliable with Cronbach alphas of 0.94 and above.  
  Next, a principal component analysis (PCA) with orthogonal rotation was run on all 20 items included in the 
ex-ante questionnaire administered before the tax game. Based on the resulting eigenvalues and the fact that the 
highlighted components accounted for 77.54 % of total variance, we took into consideration two factors (compliance 
and non-compliance).  
  Mediation analyses (Baron and Kenny, 1986) [5] run on the relation between perceived government efficiency 
and tax payments (with compliance and non-compliance as mediators), backed by the Sobel test, revealed that 
compliance did qualify as a mediator.  
  In the end we analyzed participants’ reasons to comply stated in the ex-post questionnaires and concluded that 
most of them paid tax dues because this was the “right thing to do”. Variable gender had also influence on reported 
reasons, with women being more inclined to follow social norms and being more risk averse than men.        
The study has  some  limitations. Firstly, all participants were students with little or no experience in tax 
payments, aged 19-23, which may not be familiar with tax legislation. Secondly, the employed sample might not be 
entirely representative for the student population, as not all students had the chance to be included in the database 
compiled by the authors. In the light of these realities the reported results should be interpreted with caution.  
  The shortcomings of this study pave the avenues for future research. One possible avenue is to run the study on 
representative samples of both students and experienced taxpayers. This would enable us a comparison between the 
two categories in order to detect possible differences and generalize findings to a certain degree. Another path to 
develop the study would imply organizing field experiments to check if behavior elicited during the tax game 
matches behavior in real situations. Last but not least, the study could be replicated in other countries to stress upon 
the cross-cultural differences between taxpayers and tax legislation.  
  All in all, the reported results highlight the significant impact of the perceived government efficiency on tax 
payments. In other words, the more a government is perceived as efficient in managing tax money the more 
taxpayers comply with existing legislation. In addition, they suggest that taxpayers’ behavior also falls under the 
incidence of attitudes towards compliance, especially the voluntary and enforced compliance instances. Therefore, 
governments should make additional efforts in raising their efficiency levels. In response to their actions, taxpayers’ 
voluntary compliance level could increase, thus giving governments more financial resources to provide citizens 
with high quality public goods.    
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